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1. Introduction
The literature on abstract choice theory abounds with analysis of the
possible rationality of a choice function via satisfaction of consistency prop-
erties. The identification of rational choice as the maximizer of a unique
preference has a long tradition in the literature (cf., Arrow (1959), Richter
(1966, 1971), Wilson (1970), Sen (1971), Blair et al. (1976), Suzumura
(1976, 1983), etc). But experimental economics has produced mounting
evidence against the standard model of rational choice. Manzini and Mari-
otti (2007) provide a sample of references proving that cyclical choice occurs
in simple decision problems on a regular basis. Among them, as early as
Tversky (1969) gives a classical explanation of a cyclic pattern of choice: the
alternatives have various relevant characteristics and we declare a  b and
b  c although differences between consecutive alternatives are negligible in
the foremost characteristic, but when we compare a and c their difference
in such characteristic becomes noticeable and we declare c  a.
Our contribution is in continuation of a successful branch of the litera-
ture that studies decision makers (DMs) who choose by a sequential use of
preferences that successively narrow the set of available alternatives. This
model allows for cyclical choice and for violations of the usual menu inde-
pendence properties. A focal reference is Manzini and Mariotti (2007), who
analyse singled-valued choice functions that are sequentially rationalizable,
i.e., the result of a sequential application of asymmetric binary relations
or rationales. In addition they provide a complete analysis of the case of
two and three relations. Apestegúıa and Ballester (2013) investigate the re-
striction of sequential rationalizability to acyclic rationales, which is a more
restrictive model: there are choice patterns that can be sequentially ratio-
nalized but cannot be sequentially rationalized by acyclic binary relations.
Here we investigate another related model of choice, the differences being
that (i) we do not impose that the sequential application shrinks the set
of available alternatives to exactly one final choice, (ii) we do not impose
that the rationales must be asymmetric, and (iii) we restrict our attention
to the domain of choice correspondences –or multivalued choice functions–
that verify a mild version of the property of independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives. Under such limitation, we characterize choice correspondences
that are rationalized by the sequential application of two rational criteria.
Our characterization is in terms of Expansion and a generalization for choice
correspondences of the Weak WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference),
thus replicating the characterization in Manzini and Mariotti (2007). When
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a solution exists, a uniquely determined, canonical solution is axiomatically
and explicitly identified in terms of the economically relevant constructs,
namely, the ‘rationales’.
Multivalued choice functions play a distinctive role in this literature.
Richter (1966) explicitly develops the revealed preference theory of con-
sumer’s behavior in terms of demand correspondences, rather than demand
functions. Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) extend WARP to choice correspon-
dences. Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Section 1.C, explain that they can be used
to capture the alternatives that the agent might choose. Thus for a set
of alternatives S, we collect “those alternatives that we would actually see
chosen if the decision maker were repeatedly to face the problem of choos-
ing an alternative” from set S. Furthermore, the model of “choice from
lists” in Rubinstein and Salant (2006) provides a new interpretation of the
notion of choice correspondences: in the cases where the order in the list
is not observable, choice correspondences permit to assign, to every set of
alternatives, all the elements that are chosen for some ordering of that set.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we set the notation and
introduce our model. We recall some properties of rationality for choice
correspondences and study their preservation by sequential application of
two rational criteria. Section 3 contains our main result and a discussion
on the uniqueness of the solution. In section 4 we conclude and comment
on related literature.
2. Definitions, properties of rationality and their preservation by
sequential application
Along this paper X denotes a general set of alternatives and P(X) is
the set of subsets of X. A binary relation on X, R ⊆ X ×X, is interpreted
as a preference relation of an agent, that is xRy (or (x, y) ∈ R) if and only
if the element x ∈ X is considered at least as good as the element y ∈ X.
Definitions 1 and 2 below formalize the concepts of decisive choice cor-
respondence and rational choice correspondence.
Definition 1. Let D be a nonempty domain of nonempty subsets of X,
that is, ∅ 6= D ⊆ P(X) and S 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D. A decisive choice
correspondence on D is a map C : D → P(X) such that C(S) ⊆ S and
C(S) 6= ∅ for all S ∈ D. We also refer to (decisive) choice correspondences
or multivalued choice functions as choice criteria.
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Unless otherwise stated, along this paper we are bound by two techni-
cal restrictions. Firstly, all choice correspondences are decisive thus choice
correspondence holds for decisive choice correspondence. Secondly, D is the
domain consisting of all finite and nonempty subsets of X.1
Definition 2. A choice correspondence C on D is rational if there exists a
binary relation R on X such that C(S) = CR(S) = {x ∈ S : ∀y ∈ S, (x, y) ∈
R}, for any set of alternatives S ∈ D.
Definition 2 means that the choice is made by the optimization of a bi-
nary relation and we say that the binary relation R rationalizes the choice
correspondence C. When R is acyclic, then we say that the choice corre-
spondence C is acyclic rational. As D contains all singletons and pairs of
alternatives, any binary relation that rationalizes a decisive choice corre-
spondence on D is reflexive and complete. Moreover, because D is the set
of all finite and nonempty subsets of the set of alternatives, acyclic rational
is equivalent to rational.
Rational correspondences are characterized by the following two prop-
erties (Blair et al. (1976)):
Definition 3. The choice correspondence C satisfies the Chernoff condi-
tion, also CH, if for any S, T ∈ D such that S ⊆ T we have C(T ) ∩ S ⊆
C(S).2
Definition 4. The choice correspondence C satisfies the Direct Con-
dorcet property, also Con+, if for any S ∈ D and x ∈ S we have that
x ∈ C(S) whenever x ∈ C({x, y}) for all y ∈ S.
Because we aim at identifying choice correspondences that arise from
sequential application of rational choice correspondences, a crucial previous
step is the analysis of the behavior of rationality under such sequential
process formalized as follows:
Definition 5. Let C1, C2 be choice correspondences on D. We define the
composition of C1 and C2 as the map C2 ◦ C1 : D → P(X) defined by:
(C2 ◦ C1)(A) = C2(C1(A)) for all A ∈ D
1The results would not be affected if the domain includes all the infinite subsets as
well, and even some of them are true for domains containing all pairs and all triples from
X only. We set this framework in order to avoid unnecessary technicalities.
2Equivalently: ∀S, T ∈ D, C(S ∪ T ) ⊆ C(S) ∪ C(T ) whenever S ∪ T ∈ D (Sertel and
Bellem (1979)).
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The sequential application of rational choice functions is not necessarily
rational since it produces violations of WARP. In fact it can explain cyclical
patterns of choice, as already noted by Manzini and Mariotti (2007). We
proceed to investigate when a choice correspondence can be obtained as the
sequential application of two rational criteria, in the following terms:
Definition 6. A choice correspondence C on D is rational by two sequential
criteria if there exist two rational choice correspondences C1 and C2 on D
(C2 being possibly indecisive) such that C = C2 ◦ C1.3
Manzini and Mariotti (2007) characterize choice functions C that are
RSM (Rational Shortlist Methods), that is, for which there exist two asym-
metric relations R1 and R2 such that C(S) = CR2(CR1(S)). Two axioms
are jointly necessary and sufficient for RSM, namely, Expansion and Weak
WARP. We state them in their general form for choice correspondences:
Definition 7. A choice correspondence C on D satisfies the Expansion
property 4, also E, if for any collection of subsets {Mi}i∈I in D, x ∈
C(Mi) for all i ∈ I entails x ∈ C (∪i∈IMi) .
Definition 8. A choice correspondence C satisfies the Weak WARP prop-
erty, also WWARP, if for any x, y ∈ X and S, T ∈ D such that {x, y} ⊆
S ⊆ T, C({x, y}) = {x} and x ∈ C(T )⇒ y 6∈ C(S).
It is known that E and CH are independent properties. Manzini and
Mariotti (2007) prove the independence of WWARP and E. Example 1 in
the Appendix shows that properties WWARP and E do not imply CH.
As expected, Manzini and Mariotti’s characterization does not translate
faithfully to choice correspondences. To be precise, Proposition 1 below
proves that when we compound two rational choice correspondences we
obtain a choice correspondence that satisfies E and WWARP. However
Example 2 in the Appendix proves that these axioms do not suffice to
characterize choice correspondences rational by two sequential criteria.
Proposition 1. If C1 and C2 are rational choice correspondences on D, then
the compound choice correspondence C = C2◦C1 satisfies E and WWARP.
3Observe that C2 must be nonempty-valued on {C1(S) : S ∈ D}.
4This is Sen’s Property γ.
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Proof. Let R1 and R2 be two binary relations such that C1 = CR1 and
C2 = CR2 . We proceed to check that C satisfies property E.
Let {Si}i∈I be a collection of sets in D such that x ∈ C(Si) for all i ∈ I.
We must prove that x ∈ C(
⋃
i∈I Si). Since x ∈ CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i ∈ I,
x ∈ CR1(Si) for all i ∈ I. This, together with the fact that C1 satisfies
Con+, leads to
xR1y for all y ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I ⇒ xR1y ∀y ∈
⋃
i∈I




If x 6∈ CR2(CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si)), then there exists z ∈ CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si) such that
¬(xR2z) (C2 satisfies Con+).
In addition, z ∈ CR1(
⋃
i∈I Si) implies that z ∈ CR1(Si) for some i ∈ I
(because C1 satisfies CH). From x ∈ CR2(CR1(Si)) for all i ∈ I we obtain
xR2z, a contradiction that leads to x ∈ C(
⋃
i∈I Si).
We now prove that C satisfies WWARP. Let us select {x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ T
such that {x} = (CR2 ◦ CR1)({x, y}) and x ∈ (CR2 ◦ CR1)(T ). We show that
y 6∈ C(S) by contradiction. In case y ∈ C(S) we have
(y, s) ∈ R1 for all s ∈ S and (y, s′) ∈ R2 for all s′ ∈ S such that s′R1s
for all s ∈ S
From x ∈ (CR2 ◦ CR1)(T ) we obtain (x, t) ∈ R1 for all t ∈ T. In particular:
i) (y, x) ∈ R1 because x ∈ S, and (x, y) ∈ R1 because y ∈ T, which
implies that CR1({x, y}) = {x, y}.
ii) (y, x) ∈ R2 because xR1t for all t ∈ T and S ⊆ T, which means
y ∈ CR2({x, y}).
Thus y ∈ CR2({x, y}) = CR2(CR1({x, y})) = C({x, y}), against the assump-
tion. This concludes the proof.
3. Rationalizability by two sequential criteria
In view of the discussion in Section 2, the following questions arise:
what properties permit to solve Manzini and Mariotti’s problem in the case
of multivalued choices? When a solution exists, can we give a uniquely




We proceed to prove that on a mildly restricted class of choice cor-
respondences, the testable conditions E and WWARP are sufficient to
ensure an exact realization by two sequential criteria. In other words, we
obtain a characterization of rationalizability by two sequential criteria for
multivalued choices verifying a weak property that we call ‘choosing with-
out dominated elements’. This property boils down to the elimination of
dominated elements in the presence of dominating elements, in the following
terms:
Definition 9. Let C be a choice correspondence on D. An alternative x ∈ X
is dominated by another alternative y ∈ X if x is never chosen when y
is available. That is, for any S ⊆ X such that {x, y} ⊆ S we have x 6∈ C(S).
One cannot find a finite cycle of domination, due to decisiveness. Ob-
serve that C({x, y, z, . . . , t}) = ∅ when x is dominated by y, y is dominated
by z, . . . , t is dominated by x (for any x, y, z, . . . , t ∈ S), which is absurd.
Definition 10. Let C be a choice correspondence on D. It satisfies the
property of choosing without dominated elements (CWDE) if given
two elements x, y such that x is dominated by y and x, y ∈ S ∈ D, then
C(S) = C(S \ {x}).
Remark 1. It is simple to check that if the elements x1, . . . , xk ∈ S ∈ D are
dominated (by respective y1, . . . , yk ∈ S) then C(S) = C(S \ {x1, . . . , xk}).
The reason is that the absence of cycles of domination permits to arrange
these elements so that each xi is dominated by either xj with j > i, or by
zi ∈ S \ {x1, . . . , xk}. Therefore C(S) = C(S \ {x1}) = C(S \ {x1, x2}) =
. . . = C(S \ {x1, . . . , xk}) follows immediately.
Some choice procedures are inconsistent with maximization of a prefer-
ence due to violations of the property of independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives (IIA). CWDE is a consistency axiom about the final choice behavior
that brings the ethos of the IIA axiom back into the picture in the analysis
of sequential rationalizability: it requests that if an alternative is chosen
from a set, it remains chosen when dominated alternatives are discarded
from the set, and conversely. In line with Manzini and Mariotti’s original
interpretation, under CWDE the DM considers everything but chooses as
if alternatives dominated by others had been eliminated.
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Before proceeding with our characterization it is convenient to define
the following complete binary relations on a set X (associated with a choice
correspondence C on D that satisfies Con+):
xR1y ⇔ ∃S ′ ∈ D : x, y ∈ S ′ and x ∈ C(S ′) (1)
xR2y ⇔ x ∈ C({x, y}) (2)
It is clear that C ⊆ CR1 , and property Con+ ensures CR2 ⊆ C. In short, if
C is a choice correspondence satisfying Con+ then CR1 is a rational choice
correspondence containing C and CR2 is a rational choice correspondence
contained in C.
Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995), Section 5.5, deal with these relations
in the context of approximation of choice functions. They prove that for
any rational choice correspondence C̃ such that C̃ ⊆ C it must be the case
that C̃ ⊆ CR2 ⊆ C. Similarly, for any rational choice correspondence C̄ such
that C ⊆ C̄ it must be the case that C ⊆ CR1 ⊆ C̄. In conclusion, CR1 is
the smallest rational correspondence containing C and CR2 is the greatest
rational correspondence contained in C.
We are now ready to prove our main result:
Theorem 1. Let C be a choice correspondence that verifies CWDE. Then
C is rational by two sequential criteria if and only if C verifies E and
WWARP.
Proof. Proposition 1 proves necessity without the recourse to CWDE. To
prove sufficiency let C be a choice correspondence satisfying CWDE, E
and WWARP. In order to show that there exist R1 and R2 such that
C = CR2 ◦CR1 , we consider the binary relations defined by equations (1) and
(2) above.
We first check C ⊆ CR2 ◦ CR1 . If x ∈ C(S) then x ∈ CR1(S). Now let
us suppose that x 6∈ CR2(CR1(S)). In this case there exists y ∈ CR1(S) such
that {y} = C({x, y}) by definition of CR2 . From y ∈ CR1(S) we obtain that
for all s ∈ S there exists Sys ∈ D such that y, s ∈ Sys and y ∈ C(Sys).
As C satisfies property E we conclude y ∈ C(∪s∈SSys).
Then we have {x, y} ⊆ S ⊆ ∪
s∈S
Sys with {y} = C({x, y}) and y ∈
C(∪s∈SSys).
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Applying WWARP we conclude that x 6∈ C(S), against the hypothesis.
Therefore x ∈ CR2(CR1(S)).
To complete the demonstration it remains to check that CR2◦CR1 ⊆ C. In
fact it suffices to check that (CR2◦CR1)(S) ⊆ C(CR1(S)) because C(CR1(S)) =
C(S) due to the CWDE assumption on C (see Remark 1). Let us select
x ∈ CR2(CR1(S)). If x 6∈ C(C(R1(S)) then there is y ∈ CR1(S) such that
C({x, y}) = {y}, because C satisfies E. This implies that x 6∈ CR2(CR1(S))
which is impossible.
3.2. A uniquely determined canonical representation
In Theorem 1 we prove that two explicitly defined rationales convey
the rationalization of a choice correspondence satisfying CWDE, E and
WWARP by two sequential criteria, which is an economically relevant fact
in the tradition of revealed preference theory. We cannot assure uniqueness
of the rationalizing relations. However this seems to be a minor concern
because our solution in terms of the R1 and R2 rationales delivers a uniquely
determined canonical representation, because as we have noticed above,
CR2(S) ⊆ C(S) ⊆ CR1(S) for any S ∈ D and CR1 is the smallest rational
choice correspondence that contains C, and CR2 is the greatest rational choice
correspondence contained in C.
In conclusion, under the proper circumstances we have both explicit and
axiomatic descriptions of a uniquely determined solution to the problem of
rationalizability by two sequential criteria.
4. Concluding remarks and related literature
Our research contributes to a growing literature that applies the re-
vealed preference approach to the study of individual choices that arise
from criticism to the classical postulate of maximization of one well-behaved
preference. For any given model of choice, the traditional interpretation
of the rationalizability of the observables is that we identify choice func-
tions/correspondences that could be explained as if the agent behaves ac-
cording to such model. This is our emphasis, rather than the debate whether
or not agents actually behave in that way.
In the most permissive approach, Kalai et al. (2002) observe that choice
functions are always rationalized by a collection of rationales (RMR or ra-
tionalization by multiple rationales), such that for every choice problem in
the domain, the unique choice is maximal in the problem for some rationale
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in the collection. And therefore they focus on those RMR that employ the
minimal number of orderings.
More precisely, our research relates to a recent body of work that studies
models where the final choice comes after elimination of items, especially
when rationales prune the set of alternatives. Manzini and Mariotti (2007)
prove a characterization of the Rational Shortlist Method although they
leave unanswered what can be inferred about the underlying rationales from
observed behavior. Dutta and Horan (2014) subsequently study to what
extent and how observed behavior pins down the underlying rationales in
the RSM model. Thus they are concerned by issues that we do not ad-
dress here either: an exact characterization of all pairs of rationales that
represent a given choice function, and a uniqueness result that is original in
this analysis (to wit, a characterization of the transformations of any rep-
resentation that induce the same choice behavior). Au and Kawai (2011)
study transitive-RSMs, a model more restrictive than RSMs that requires
transitivity for both rationales. It is characterized by an axiom that rules
out choice functions that reveal a cyclic preference relation, although the
transitive-RSM model allows for cyclic behavior too. In a different vein,
Apestegúıa and Ballester (2013) show that choice with a status quo bias
(Masatlioglu and Ok (2005)) is a refinement of sequential rationalizability,
which can be described in terms of their sequential procedure guided by
routes. Houy (2007) analyses whether the order of the criteria affects the
final choice or not in the model by sequential rationalizability with unre-
stricted rationales. He proves that in the case of choice functions, the order-
independence of sequentially rational choices is necessary and sufficient to
explain rational choices. Relatedly, lexicographic heuristics have also raised
the interest of e.g., Houy and Tadenuma (2009), who study two distinct
procedures of choice by lexicographic application of multiple criteria, and
Manzini and Mariotti (2012), who develop a model of boundedly rational
choice that generalizes ideas in Tversky (1969) and explore its connection
with sequential rationalizability. Among earlier contributions in this line,
Aizerman and Malishevski (1986) study when a two stage process can be
reduced to a one stage case having the same solution, and Aleskerov and
Cinar (2008) study the representability by a one-stage scalar extremiza-
tion model of a particular two-stage model in which the first stage selects
alternatives that are dominated by no more than q alternatives and the
second one is a scalar extremization model. In this trend the assumption is
made that the agent is aware of all available alternatives and (acts as if he)
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consciously eliminates some of them, a case of limited consideration.
Various models involving the use of consideration sets in decision theory
have been proposed to capture other possible sources of limited considera-
tion, e.g., (i) unawareness or bounded understanding of what is available as
in Masatlioglu et al. (2012), (ii) excessive abundance of alternatives as in
Lleras et al. (2011), or even (iii) psychological restrictions as in Cherepanov
et al. (2013). A consideration set is the subset of all available options to
which the DM pays attention. Masatlioglu et al. (2012) provide a choice
theoretical foundation for maximizing a complete and transitive relation un-
der limited attention. One behavioral postulate of choice called WARP(LA)
characterizes their model of “choice with limited attention”. The consid-
eration sets in their model must be inferred from the DM’s final choice.
Relatedly, Masatlioglu and Nakayima (2013) are concerned with an envi-
ronment where it is not realistic to assume that the DM knows the entire
feasible set of alternatives. Therefore they deal with a consideration set that
evolves during the course of search because the DM must explore it. Lleras
et al. (2011) explicitly define limited consideration sets to capture system-
atic failures to consider available options due to the paradox of choice. 5
A single behavioral principle called LC-WARP characterizes their model of
“choice with limited consideration” (CLC) in the case of choice functions.
Cherepanov et al. (2013) study DMs who have preferences over alternatives
and a set of rationales (modeled as binary relations). The DM chooses the
alternative she prefers among the feasible options that are optimal accord-
ing to at least one of her rationales, called the permissible options. Put
differently, she makes her choice from each subset among its permissible
alternatives only.
We consider choice correspondences that verify the following mild con-
sistency axiom: choice is unaffected by removing an alternative that would
never be chosen when some others are available. As is common in this
literature, we assume that choices from every possible problem are known.
Then we extend the characterization of sequential rationality by two criteria
given by Manzini and Mariotti (2007) for choice functions. We prove that
choice correspondences in our class are rational by two sequential criteria if
and only if they satisfy the properties of Expansion and a generalization of
their WWARP for choice correspondences. 6
5A particular specification of their model for single-valued choice is a strict subclass
of the RSM, therefore of our model.
6Tyson (2013) provides a different Generalized WWARP for choice correspondences
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Of course the use of not necessarily single-valued choice correspondences
in models with multiple criteria is not original to our work. We have com-
mented upon the model of “choice from lists” in Rubinstein and Salant
(2006) and its interplay with choice correspondences. 7 Houy (2007) shows
that the extension of his aforementioned characterization to choice corre-
spondences is no longer true although the necessity part of the statement
remains valid. Demuynck (2011) studies the computational complexity of
various choice models that use multiple rationales to explain observed choice
behavior in the form of choice correspondences, which includes the case of
Apestegúıa and Ballester (2010). Lleras et al. (2011) separately consider the
analysis of their model of CLC with multivalued choices in an Appendix.
Now they need two axioms to characterize CLC. 8 Dutta and Horan (2014)
conclude by hinting that their main results on identification of rationales can
be extended to choice correspondences, which would complement our work
in the same sense that their proven results for choice functions complement
Manzini and Mariotti (2007). However their uniqueness argument crucially
hinges on the property that choices are univalued. Tyson (2013) considers
“two-stage shortlisting procedures in which the menu of alternatives is first
pruned by a process or criterion and then a binary relation is maximized”,
and he proves a meta-characterization in a formal setting that is completely
devoid of background assumptions like single-valued choice or domain re-
strictions. In particular, his analysis accepts multivalued choice outputs
from any unrestricted collection of menus. The assumption of an exhaus-
tive dataset has also been criticized by de de Clippel and Rozen (2012) both
from an empirical and experimental standpoint. These authors attempt to
provide a better understanding of how to test bounded rationality theories
when datasets are limited. They show that Samuelson’s revealed preference
approach can generalize to theories of bounded rationality in the analysis
of choice functions.
There is also an emerging literature that applies the revealed preference
approach to the study of collective decisions. Similarly to our approach,
in his Condition 3.20.
7In a related line, Yildiz (2012) characterizes list rational choice functions, that is,
choice functions for which there exist a list and a binary relation in such a way that
the DM makes his choice by successive comparisons of the alternatives according to the
binary relation and following the list.
8To this purpose, the natural modification of their original axiom LC-WARP extends
the concept of revealed indifference. An earlier treatment of revealed indifference in
choice theory can be found in Alcantud (2002).
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the main aim is to identify the testable restrictions of theories of collective
decision-making when individual preferences are not observable. A funda-
mental work in the abstract context –i.e., without the restrictions of earlier
contributions to for example, household behavior or the general equilib-
rium model– is Sprumont (2010). A recent reference with a nice review of
the literature dealing with noncooperative game-theoretic solution concepts
is Bossert and Sprumont (2013), who prove that every choice function is
backwards-induction rationalizable. The extension of this result to choice
correspondences has been independently proven by Rehbeck (2014) and
Xiong (2014).
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Example 1. There exist choice correspondences satisfying E (and there-
fore Con+) and WWARP, but not CH. The choice correspondence C on
P∗(X) when X = {x, y, z} given by Table 1 proves this assertion: it fails
to verify CH because {y, z} ⊆ {x, y, z} but C({x, y, z}) ∩ {y, z} = {y} *
C({y, z}) = {z}.
Table 1. C satisfies E and WWARP, but not CH
S {x, y} {x, z} {y, z} {x, y, z}
C(S) {x, y} {x} {z} {x, y}
Example 2. There exist choice correspodences that satisfy E and WWARP
and are not rational by two sequential criteria. The choice correspondence
C on P∗(X) when X = {x, y, z, t, s} given by Table 2 proves this assertion.
Table 2. C satisfies E and WWARP and is not
rational by two sequential criteria
S {x, y} {x, z} {x, t} {x, s} {y, z} {y, t}
C(S) {y} {x, z} {x, t} {x, s} {z} {y}
S {y, s} {z, t} {z, s} {t, s} {x, y, z} {x, y, t}
C(S) {s} {z, t} {z} {t} {z} {y}
S {x, y, s} {x, z, t} {x, z, s} {x, t, s} {y, z, t} {y, z, s}
C(S) {s} {x, z, t} {x, z} {x, t} {z} {z}
S {y, t, s} {z, t, s} {x, y, z, t} {x, y, z, s} {x, y, t, s} {x, z, t, s}
C(S) {t} {z, t} {z, t} {x, z} {x, t} {x, z, t}
S {y, z, t, s} {x, y, z, t, s}
C(S) {z, t} {x, z, t}
A direct inspection shows that C satisfies properties E and WWARP.
To prove that it is not rational by two sequential criteria, assume by way of
contradiction that C1 and C2 are rational choice correspondences such that
C = C2 ◦ C1.
It must be the case that x, z, t ∈ C1({x, y, z, t, s}) and applying that C1
satisfies CH, x, z, t ∈ C1({x, y, z, t}). Now two possibilities arise:
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1. C1({x, y, z, t}) = {x, y, z, t}.
In this case, C = C2 ◦ C1 implies that C2({x, y, z, t}) = {z, t}. Because
C1 and C2 satisfy CH one has C1({y, t}) = {y, t} and t ∈ C2({y, t}),
which leads to t ∈ (C2 ◦ C1)({y, t}) thus (C2 ◦ C1)({y, t}) 6= C({y, t}).
2. C1({x, y, z, t}) = {x, z, t}.
From C = C2 ◦ C1 we obtain C2({x, z, t}) = {z, t}. Because C1 satisfies
CH one has C1({x, z, t}) = {x, z, t} thus (C2 ◦C1)({x, z, t}) = {z, t} 6=
C({x, z, t}).
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